Showing posts with label culture. Show all posts
Showing posts with label culture. Show all posts

Thursday, April 17, 2014

23 Reasons Not to Talk to Strangers? Or...

...Little Red Riding Hood?

My friend and former colleague Eric Pelletier blogs in a wonderful post, Croissants and fairy tales. How storytelling makes strategy happen that
...when people in a similar context, are exposed to the same facts, they tend to arrive at the same conclusions. And so, when they're in the same organization then, they're also likely to arrive at the same conclusion about the right strategy to take the organization forward.
While he focuses on the power of getting people on board via storytelling to implement strategies, I have little doubt he'd agree about the power of creating shared conclusions on formulating a winning strategy in the first place.

In The Biggest Problem in Strategy? Mindset, I noted how the railroads in post war America missed out on growth opportunities because they saw themselves in the railroad business, not the transportation business, and how Blockbuster missed out on digital distribution, ignoring intelligence on the looming threat. While railroad efficiency made enormous strides post deregulation in 1980, it basically kept the surviving companies in the game. Rail's share of freight traffic in the US (measured in ton-miles) declined from about 75% in 1930 (A Short History of US Freight Railroads, pp3) to 28% in 2000 (Freight-Rail Bottom Line Report, pp 14). Worse, its share of freight revenues dropped to a mere 6%. Blockbuster went bankrupt in 2011, shuttering the last of its outlets in 2013. Other examples of failed strategies aren't hard to find: cell phone manufacturers Nokia and Motorola; bookstores Borders and Barnes and Noble; computer manufacturer Sun; the plethora of desktop application software firms - remember VisiCalc, Lotus 1-2-3 and Freelance Graphics and WordPerfect, all of which dominated at one time?

Storytelling works because of the evolution of the prefrontal cortex of the human brain, which helps us recognize and act on patterns. It also works, as Eric notes, because it creates a shared context, or "experience" (even if vicarious) in the tribe. 

But this pattern-recognizing ability is both a help and a hindrance, for individuals and groups. It helps tremendously when the situation is reasonably stable, but often fails us in times of significant environmental change, when we are unable to recognize new patterns. And the worst failures occur when the "tribe," and especially the decision-making leadership, is unable to jettison outdated mindsets.

The most powerful stories are the ones collectively arrived at, through shared experiences. And the most powerful of these are crises. IBM (where I worked for the better part of a decade), was able to reinvent itself in the early 1990s because the tribe members (the employees) knew there was no other choice, enabling Lou Gerstner to drive a change in the collective mindset. But it was painful, to the tune of 200,000 layoffs.

So I return to a theme readers of my blog will recognize: why not create simulated "crises" to enable decision-makers to "experience" the consequences of potential actions. Militaries, governments and airline pilots (see Chance Only Favors Prepared Minds) do this regularly. And some companies regularly incorporate scenario planning or business wargaming (among other experiential planning techniques), designed and facilitated by experts for maximum effectiveness, into strategy development.

Companies that invest in these now, incorporating the latest available intelligence on potential opportunities or threats, reap huge future returns and often avoid debilitating disasters.

Wednesday, March 26, 2014

Creating Winning Strategies by Changing the Dialogue

In far too many companies, "strategy" has become a euphemism for planning or budgeting. The underlying - and unstated - assumption is that marketplace conditions are largely static: the future will be largely an extension of the past and, thus, all we need to do is optimize our current operations.

This assumption, unfortunately, has proved fatal in industry after industry. Just a few years ago, Motorola and Nokia were major cell phone players, Sun was a significant server manufacturer, Blockbuster was the source for many of us for at-home movie viewing, and Borders and Barnes and Noble were where we shopped for books...

To drive serious strategic discussions, you first need to accurately assess your source of competitive advantage. Here's a framework we've found useful:

Source of Competitive Advantage (worst to first):


1. Commodity with cost disadvantage
2. Commodity with cost parity
3. Commodity with 10% to 20% cost advantage
4. One-year offering development lead
5. Two-year offering development lead
6. Brand, patent, copyright
7. Owning the customer relationship
8. A string of dominant positions (for example, cost advantage + development lead + patent protection
9. Managing the value net or ecosystem
10. Owning the industry standard

Importance of Marketplace Insight


The first two, of course, confer no competitive advantage; unfortunately, a realistic assessment of their true competitive position would surprise many companies... Hence the importance of helping decision makers develop relevant marketplace insight. Answers to these critical questions will help:

  • What are customers really buying? How are their preferences changing?
  • What new initiatives are current competitors undertaking: operations, innovation, marketing, sales, customer service?
  • What economic or regulatory trends will impact the industry?
  • Which emerging competitors have the potential to change the nature of competitive dynamics?

Assessing the Consequences


Once the decision makers have grappled with these issues, they'll need to assess the impact on the organization, including:
  • Systems and processes: Do we need to change our offerings development or production processes? Which need to be re-engineered? Which can we outsource? What support do we need from IT?
  • People and skills: Do we need to retrain our existing workforce? Change our hiring requirements? Restructure the organization?
  • Culture: Do we need to change the behaviors? If so, where? Only in specific functions? Or everywhere in the organization?
  • Incentives: Do we have the right incentives in place? And how will we align these across the organization?
  • Profits: How will we make money in the future? How can we protect our profit streams?

    Creating Winning Strategies


    With all of the above in hand, decision makers can proceed to the important work of re-allocating resources to create:
    • Differentiated value propositions
    • Innovation, operational and go-to market initiatives
    • Organizational alignment
    Challenging work, all this, since it means the nature of the strategic discussion must change, from planning / budgeting to strategy, from past to future and from business-as-usual to new business models. Importantly, it means changing mental models - how decision makers interpret information about the marketplace. And this, in turn, means creating opportunities for dialogue and debate, v. reading reports.

    But it could mean the difference between organizational life and death.

    Friday, December 13, 2013

    How Good Are Your Marketplace Insight Capabilities?

    Since posting Insight is Where the Game is Won and Lost, many have asked "how can we assess our insights capabilities to identify where to focus?" Building on both internal work I did in the early 2000s, and an article published independently by Herring and Leavitt in 2011,* here is a framework you can use to quickly evaluate your organization's insights capabilities. There are five dimensions to rate your organization on (directions at the bottom):
    • Insights culture
    • Sources used to generate the information base to help create insights
    • Marketplace focus
    • Personnel
    • Early warning of emerging threats and opportunities
    The organization's culture sets the tone for insights creation, which can address markets, customers, technology or competition. Initially reactive (Level 1), executives ask for data and task available personnel to gather information for a presentation or meeting, invariably sourced from easy-to-access published data, such as annual reports, existing market research or industry analyses. The initial focus is on traditional markets, customers, technology and competitors.

    Soon, a frustrated executive or ambitious analyst determines that standardized profiles, newsletters and databases will improve organization awareness. Dedicated, often part-time individuals (becoming full-time as demand increases) standardize outputs, create delivery schedules and expand the fact base to include subscriptions to specialized industry publications, and start to focus on partnerships and alliances which impact growth and the ability to compete (Level 2).

    Success begets more challenging questions, such as what does this data mean? how will the trends play out? and what emerging customers, technologies and competitors should we be concerned about? Improving capability requires teams of skilled analysts under a functional manager (Level 3). Since the answers are rarely contained in published data, analysts must incorporate validated opinion and observations from individuals who don't have the time to write it all down - customers, channel partners, R&D and sales personnel, their own executives, and industry observers and experts.

    The expanding organizational knowledge base generates new requirements: what are the implications of these projections? what options do we have? what should we do about them? how might customers or competitors react? how feasible is a new technology? Mature organizations assign or recruit a senior leader to answer these, using increasingly sophisticated research and analysis techniques and a well-nurtured source network. And the organization expands its focus to better understand the interactions within the industry value chain and how these will play out (Level 4).

    Finally, a radical shift occurs, from an emphasis on producing reports to facilitating dialog: the organization structures insights-driven strategic decision-making sessions (Level 5). Key executives interact directly with well-prepared internal and external experts, to determine how to best position the enterprise for future success. Topics might include identifying and evaluating the strategic risks of potential new initiatives, untapped sources of customer value, the next generation of customers, emerging competitive threats (frequently through business wargames) and new growth opportunities.

    The importance of early warning. 


    The organization's ability to avoid surprises - a major executive concern - increases with the sophistication of its insights capabilities. Fledgling operations frequently start by looking at any of a variety of "megatrends" (example here), "boiling the ocean" to try to find a something the organization can act on. They progress to tracking studies, targeted assessments of specific marketplace issues and systematic monitoring of the periphery (emerging customers, competitors and technologies). But real breakthroughs occur when organizations form heavyweight teams, consisting of both internal and external experts, to address critical emerging issues through innovation and new business models.

    How good is your organization's insight capability? Identify where it is in each category, sum the associated levels, and divide by five. If it is:
    • below 2.0, it is drowning, with little chance of a lifeline in the next round of budget cuts
    • between 2.0 - 3.0, it is treading water, with increasing odds of getting a lifeline
    • between 3.0 - 4.0, the shore is in sight, but beware of undercurrents
    • above 4.0, the beachhead is secured and the insights function is capable of making a real difference
    Now ask what will it take to improve? And, importantly, what will be the impact on the business?

    * Herring, Jan and Judith Leavitt, "The Roadmap to a World-Class Intelligence Program," Competitive Intelligence, January - March, 2011 

    Wednesday, December 11, 2013

    Growth is Hard

    Columbia Business School professor Rita Gunther McGrath writes that only 8% of the 5,000 companies with over $1 billion in revenues grew sales by 5% annually over a 5 year period, and only 4% grew net income by at least 5% annually.* Compounding the challenge are the prevailing conditions found in many markets:
    • The new product failure rate is repugnantly high: estimates range from a minimum of 40% to as high as 95%; 
    • Few completely new categories have emerged in recent years;
    • Risk aversion results in few real disruptive market strategies;
    • Rivalry is intense and along many dimensions;
    • The role of channels is becoming ever more pervasive and powerful; and
    • Cost pressures continue to escalate, absorbing significant company resources to address.
    Companies can beat the odds through a structured approach (chart):
    • Marketplace insight – What is the customer need or problem a new growth initiative will resolve? How have recent competitive and supplier initiatives and technological developments impacted customer needs? What is going on in competitors’ minds, what are they planning, and how will they respond to our initiatives?
    • Opportunity assessment and selection – How can we extend current capabilities to address new opportunities or change the nature of competition? How do we develop and test new growth opportunities beyond our current strategy? Which customer segments will we choose to serve? Which will we not serve?
    • Strategy – How do we resolve a market problem / need in a valuable and differentiated manner? What is the value proposition? How will we capture value, what scope of activities will we perform and how will we protect our profit? 
    • Organization alignment – What processes, systems, structures, and incentives need to be changed? What will inhibit successful execution of the growth strategy: culture, mindsets, resources, incentives?
    • Execution – What specific actions will deliver the product / offering and profitably capture value? How will we measure success? How will we monitor results?
    *McGrath, Rita Gunther, “How the Growth Outliers Did It,” Harvard Business Review, January – February 2012

    Monday, December 2, 2013

    Droning On: Strategy Isn't Dead, Not by a Long Shot...


    Last week, blogger Mark Wilson, in a post entitled "The End of Strategy as We Know It," noted that strategy has become "too slow; too inflexible, too cautious; too protectionist." He bemoans "old-school strategy" and asserts that "businesses need to think strategically, on a daily basis...the solution is that "business leaders should focus on their organisation's innovation behaviour and how to build a culture that supports it."*

    At least he got it partly right, unlike Saatchi & Saatchi's CEO Kevin Roberts, who said last year that "strategy is dead, the big idea is dead, management is dead and marketing, as we know it, is also dead." Then he really stepped into it: "Who really knows what is going to happen anymore in this super VUCA [volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous] world. The more time and money you spend devising strategies the more time you are giving your rivals to start eating your lunch."**

    No one, of course, KNOWS what's going to happen in the future. But throwing up your hands is dangerous.

    Take Jeff Bezos' revelation on 60 Minutes last night that amazon.com is testing drones for package delivery. If successful, small packages could be delivered within 30 minutes. Attention getting sound bite? Without a doubt.

    But listen closely to Bezos: "I would define Amazon by our big ideas, which are customer centricity, putting the customer at the center of everything we do, invention." Looking deeper, Amazon Fresh, which started delivering groceries in Seattle several years, has now expanded to Los Angeles. Grocery customers typically want same-day delivery and, says Bezos, "if we can make this model work, it would be great because it extends the range of products that we can sell."***

    Now this is "old school strategy." What Bezos recognizes that Wilson and Roberts miss is that effective strategies start with insight that defines a marketplace opportunity. Only then can you innovate around customer needs and then drive the necessary changes in systems, structure, skills and culture through the entire organization to meet those needs. Focusing on innovation unlinked to a defined opportunity and you become Xerox PARC, whose radical innovations (Ethernet, laser printers, the GUI and even the modern PC among others) were successfully commercialized by others, not Xerox.

    No, "old school strategy" is not dead.

    But those who dismiss it soon will be. Their rivals will eat their lunch.

    *Wilson, Mark, "Is This the End of Strategy as We Know It?", One Last Thing (blog), http://thehumanlayer.com/issues/issue-7/22-one-last-thing/index.html#!

    **"Strategy is dead says Saatchi & Saatchi CEO," The Drum, April 25, 2012, http://www.thedrum.com/news/2012/04/25/marketing-dead-says-saatchi-saatchi-ceo

    ***"Jeff Bezos Looks to the Future," 60 Minutes, December 1, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazons-jeff-bezos-looks-to-the-future/

    Wednesday, November 20, 2013

    You Can't Find What You're Not Looking For

    Ask the right questions

    Smoke detectors are programmed for early warning. But they don't detect CO2, equally as dangerous.

    With a specific threat - or opportunity - identified, designing a system or capability to capture and process the relevant signals and issue an alert is pretty straightforward.

    The challenge for companies is to articulate the potential business threat or opportunity. But in a dynamic marketplace, these are everywhere. Organizations simply can’t monitor every Bill and Dave or Steve and Steve in their garages or Jeff in his warehouse.

    It is exacerbated when organizations obsess on collecting reams of customer data or developing in-depth competitor profiles, especially when these focus is on what the customers wanted or what the competitor did. The often-unstated assumption – the mindset – is that the future will be largely like the past and, circuitously, the historical facts support the prevailing view.

    But there are no “facts” about the future.

    Creating the necessary insight requires asking the right questions:
    • How will new technologies and business value propositions impact our customers, products, services, and business growth?
    • Which industries, customer segments and offerings categories offer the best likelihood of future business growth?
    • Who are the most threatening traditional, emerging and potential competitors? Why?
    • Where are the greatest long-term profit streams according to the capital markets?
    • What is required for future competitive success?
    How many organizations have good answers to these questions? How many have the leadership that asks them?

    You can’t find what you’re not looking for.

    Next: Creating Crises

    Monday, November 18, 2013

    Avoiding "Surprises"

    Early Warning
    Early Warning

    Had these experienced commanders and executives (see the prior post, "Surprise") known what was coming, they could have redeployed assets and avoided catastrophic “surprises.” Today, of course, we can see that the available information provided sufficient early warning of clear threats - hindsight is 20/20.

    But why is it these leaders couldn't see the signs at the time?

    In retailing, it is not as if amazon.com and its offshoots were unknowns by the late 1990s. However, the prevailing view of traditional retailers was that marketplace success required opening as many stores as possible to both gain share and blunt competition. These built vast organization structures around site location, logistics, inventory, HR and downstream (promotional) marketing. And the most successful developed sophisticated information systems that reported operational performance variation in increasingly exacting detail. Have a hot selling item in one location? Easy - find excess inventory and load it on the next shipment. Poor performance in another? Schedule a performance review with store management to isolate and fix the root cause.

    What they didn't have was an information system to warn of emerging strategic threats. No doubt these executives received information about the impact of Internet business models. But, unlike the internal information, it was unstructured, arriving initially in dribs and drabs. By the time clear trends emerged, the successful early Internet movers had learned from their mistakes and established defensible niches.

    Caught in the daily exigencies of running an enterprise, these leaders simply weren't programmed to evaluate the nature of the available early warning intelligence within the context of their brick-and-mortar operational mindset and information expectations. And, eventually, when they did assess the threat, they were constrained by the amount of investments required to overcome the first-mover advantage, which would have required diverting significant resources from successful operations.

    Waiting until information is absolutely certain (right hand side of the chart) results in a crisis, forcing leaders to rapidly rethink critical assumptions: maintaining outdated mindsets when bombs are falling or bankruptcy looms is suicidal. But it may be too late: they have very little flexibility in how to respond – you can’t re-position a fleet immediately or turn a brick and mortar operation into an e-commerce one overnight.

    On the other hand, way back in relative time (the left hand side), leadership has more leeway in deciding where to deploy assets. However, the uncertain and often conflicting information makes it difficult, if not impossible, to challenge the existing organization mindset.

    Avoiding “surprise” requires speeding up the processing of relevant information, moving the information certainty line upward and the intersection of the two lines to the left, when there is more decision-making flexibility.

    Creating the intelligence necessary to challenge assumptions earlier requires choice and focus – every startup or new technology is a potential threat. And, perhaps perversely to some, the solution is not simply amassing and sorting through vast amounts of data. 

    It requires asking the right questions.

    Next: You Can't Find What You're Not Looking For

    Friday, November 15, 2013

    "Surprise"

    December 7, 1941
    Nothing frustrates executives I speak with more than a crisis caused by surprise: a new competitor product or unexpected price cut, unexpected loss of a key bid or long-held account, or new technologies or shifts in buyer behavior that obsolete current offerings. And heads roll when these cause a miss in quarterly earnings or, worse, bankruptcy.

    The question that always arises is how could we have avoided surprise?

    Lack of knowledge is not the problem. “We now live in a world where knowledge transfer and information exchange are tremendously efficient, and where there are numerous organizations in the business of collecting and transferring best practices. So, there are fewer and smaller differences in what firms know than in their ability to act on that knowledge.”*

    Said another way, surprise rarely occurs due to a lack of signals. Information on the Toyota Production System was available to the US auto industry for decades, and traditional retailers certainly had time to absorb intelligence on amazon.com’s business model well in advance of having to declare bankruptcy. In the military sphere, “an analysis of surprise attacks suggests that the intelligence community seldom fails to anticipate them owing to a lack of relevant information.” And a US Congressional Subcommittee that examined several critical US political crises pointed out that “in no case had lack of data been a major factor in the failure to anticipate the crisis.”**

    Take Pearl Harbor – why did the US navy fail to detect anytime in advance the movement the most powerful fleet in history? It was not as if Japan’s blue water fleet was a surprise – in 1905 it destroyed the Russian Pacific fleet. Nor were Japan’s expansionist intentions a secret – it invaded Manchuria in 1931. And it’s not as if the US Pacific Fleet wasn't concerned about the Imperial Japanese Navy: it knew it was the only real threat to those intentions. Finally, beginning in early in 1941, there was a slew of signals that the Japanese navy was targeting Pearl Harbor.

    Given this, “intelligence officers could perhaps have foreseen the attack if the US, years before, had…flown regular aerial reconnaissance of the Japanese navy, put intercept units aboard ships sailing close to Japan…or recruited a network of marine observers to report on ship movements.”***

    Did the US Navy create its own surprise?

    Next: Avoiding "Surprises"

    *Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Robert Sutton, The Knowing-Doing Gap, Harvard Business School Press, 2000
    **Kam, Ephraim, Surprise Attack, Harvard University Press, 1988
    ***Kahn, David, "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor, Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/1992)

    Friday, November 1, 2013

    Understand the Competitor's Strategic Intent

    What do you need to know about the competition?

    The most important thing you need to know is their strategic intent – what is it they are trying to accomplish. Once you understand this, you’ll have a framework for understanding virtually every decision they make, from hiring key personnel, to product strategy, benefits, features and functionality and pricing. Take, for example, a competitor whose CEO has made aggressive revenue growth commitments. You might deduce s/he will aggressively pursue every opportunity in the marketplace, regardless of profitability. Or, if the technical staff dominates development, offerings may include features and functionality customers don't care about.

    You don’t need 100-page documents, chock full of data but poor on insights. If your CI team is producing these, fire them. What you need is a one-page report that shows the competitor’s approach and what their likely next actions will be. You need to understand their key people – what they do and how they think, because people and organizations repeat their successes. You need to understand the likely impact of new initiatives, and their financial and technical capabilities. And, most importantly, you need to understand the competitor’s culture

    Lou Gerstner was maniacally focused on customers and competition from the first day he joined he joined IBM. At his first executive retreat, he forced his senior executives into red-team exercises and asked them to attack their own businesses as if they were the primary competitors. He got immediate results, and extended the concept by naming each senior executive to be in charge of a major competitor as part of their responsibilities.

    Make your executive peers part of your CI team. You’ll be delighted with the results.

    Next: Differentiation: What Really Matters